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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented by this appeal: 
1. Whether the notice of claim required by Section 63-
30-11 and 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), must 
be timely filed where the State of Utah has falsely represented 
to the claimant that the person against whom the claim is made is 
not an employee of the State of Utah. 
2. Whether the doctrine of interspousal immunity 
applies to preclude a suit of a husband by a wife concerning an 
accident which occurred in the State of Utah, where both husband 
and wife were at the time of the accident and at the time of suit 
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residents of California. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Plaintiff, Audrey Forsman, brought this action to 
recover for serious injuries sustained when a vehicle in which 
she was a passenger collided with another automobile. The action 
was brought against her husband, George Forsman, the driver of 
the vehicle in which she was riding, and Ronald G. Flinders 
("Flinders"), the driver of the other vehicle. 
Course of Proceedings 
The Plaintiff's action was consolidated with an action 
by the Utah Department of Public Safety, Narcotic & Liquor Law 
Enforcement Division, against George Leland Forsman, concerning 
the same accident (R. 50-52). 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
On October 31, 1985, Summary Judgement was granted in 
favor of the Defendant Flinders (R. 156). On June 17, 1986, 
Summary Judgment was granted in favor of the Defendant George 
Forsman (R. 201). Both rulings were formalized by orders entered 
June 26, 1986 (R. 205-210). 
On July 23, 1986, an Order Granting Express 
Determination and Express Direction was entered (R. 213-215) , 
making the Summary Judgments in favor of Flinders and George 
Forsman appealable under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed by the Plaintiff on July 
2 
25, 1986 (R. 216-217). 
Statement of Facts 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that the following 
facts are undisputed, or are supported by substantial evidence. 
Therefore, for purposes of Defendants1 motions for summary 
judgment, such facts should have been resolved in the Plaintiff's 
favor. 
On June 22, 1983, the Plaintiff, a passenger in an 
automobile driven by the Defendant George Forsman, was very 
seriously injured in a collision between the vehicle in which she 
was riding and an automobile driven by the Defendant Flinders. 
This action was brought as a result of the serious injuries 
sustained by the Plaintiff. 
At the time of the subject accident and at all times 
since, the Defendant George Forsman and the Plaintiff were 
husband and wife and residents of California (R. 183). 
Immediately after the accident, the Defendant Flinders 
stated that he was an employee of the State of Utah and that the 
vehicle which he was driving was registered to the State of Utah 
(R. 39) . 
Withing one year after the subject accident, the 
Plaintifffs representative conducted a license plate search at 
the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles, for license no. MPV 372, 
the number shown in the Utah Investigating Officerfs Report on 
the subject automobile accident for the vehicle driven by 
Flinders. He was told by the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles 
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Vehicles that there was no record of issuance of any plate within 
the state with the designation MPV 372 (R. 22-26). 
Within one year after the subject accident, the 
Plaintiff's representative did a driverfs license check on the 
name of Ronald G. Flinders and was given an address of Po0. Box 
354, Clearfield, Utah 84105 (R. 22-24). The Plaintiff sent 
letters to Flinders at the foregoing address, which were returned 
as undeliverable (R. 35). 
Within one year after the subject automobile accident, 
the Plaintiff's representative requested confirmation of 
Flinders' employment from the Utah Division of Personnel 
Management, and was advised that an individual with that name was 
not employed by the State of Utah (R. 22-24). 
Within one year after the subject automobile accident, 
notice was mailed to Ronald G. Flinders at the address given in 
the police report of the subject accident (R. 34, 39). Such 
notice was returned undelivered (R. 36). 
As a result of the foregoing false representations by 
the State of Utah, the Plaintiff was unable to determine the 
"responsible governmental entity" or "agency concerned" which 
employed Flinders, so as to give notice to such entity within the 
one-year time period allowed by Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-12, 
Utah Code Annotated (R. 22-24) . 
The Complaint was filed on November 13, 1984, prior to 
the first point at which the Plaintiff or any of her represent-
atives was informed that Flinders was a state employee (R. 2-5). 
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The Order of the District Court, granting Summary 
Judgment in favor of Flinders, found that "there was unrefuted 
testimony by affidavit that the State of Utah denied through the 
Division of Personnel Management that Defendant Flinders was an 
employee of the State of Utah" (R. 208). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant Flinders 
was erroneous because the State of Utah, by falsely denying that 
Flinders was a state employee, is estopped from relying on the 
one-year notice requirement of Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-12, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953)• The Plaintiff should have been 
permitted to present evidence to show her due diligence in 
attempting to discover whether Flinders was a state employee, and 
misrepresentation or concealment by the State of Utah. 
The Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant George 
Forsman was erroneous because California law, which allows suits 
between spouses for negligent torts, should have been applied to 
a suit between California residents. In addition, Utah should 
reject the spousal immunity doctrine, if it has no done so 
already, so as to make suits between spouses permissible. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 
AT TRIAL TO PROVE EITHER HER DUE DILIGENCE IN 
ATTEMPTING TO DISCOVER WHETHER FLINDERS WAS 
EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OF UTAH, OR MISREPRESENT-
ATION OR CONCEALMENT BY THE STATE OF UTAH 
Although the state provided an affidavit relating to 
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the state's "policy", the evidence was undisputed that in this 
particular instance, the State of Utah/ whether knowingly or 
unknowingly/ had falsely represented that Flinders was not an 
employee of the state. The court specifically found the 
testimony unrefuted that the State of Utah denied that Flinders 
was a state employee (R. 208) • In any event, disputed testimony 
should have been resolved in the Plaintifffs favor for purposes 
of the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
This case is controlled by Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 
583 P.2d 105 (Utah 1978). In Vincent/ the Plaintiffs brought an 
action for damages to their garage caused by a leaking county 
storm drain. The first signs of damage had been observed in 
1971/ and Plaintiffs did not give written notice to the county 
until August 30, 1974. Section 63-30-13 of the Utah Governmental 
Immunities Act required notice within 90 days of the claim 
against a political subdivision. The Plaintiffs had known of the 
existence of the storm drain and had inquired of the county, but 
had been told by the county that no correlation existed between 
the storm drain and the cracks. In holding for the Plaintiff, 
the Court said: 
[I]t is incongruous to require plaintiffs to 
commence an action against the county when 
the cause of the damage is unknown to 
plaintiffs, and they have reasonably relied 
to their detriment upon the county's false 
representations regarding the leaking pipe. 
The trial court did not err in holding 
plaintiffs gave timely written notice on 
August 30, 1974. 
Id. at 107. Similarly, the Plaintiff in the present action was 
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entitled to the opportunity to prove that she reasonably relied 
to her detriment upon the state's false representations regarding 
Flinders1 employment. 
In Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981), the 
guardians of a minor ward failed to file-a wrongful death action 
within two years of the wardfs death, because the guardians 
mistakenly thought that their ward was still alive but missing. 
The Plaintiffs had offered evidence of their diligence in 
attempting to discover the whereabouts of their ward, and 
evidence that the Defendant had made false statements relating to 
the victim's identity at the time of his death, so as to mislead 
the Plaintiffs and prevent a complete inquiry. The trial court 
had dismissed the action on the basis of the statute of 
limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
Plaintiffs were entitled to an opportunity at trial to prove 
either their due diligence, or their claim of concealment or 
misleading by Defendant. The Court said: 
In this case, the policy [of the statute of 
limitations] against stale claims is also 
outweighed by the unique circumstances of 
plaintiffs1 hardship ... If plaintiffs are 
denied the opportunity of proceeding with 
that action, the law would be in the 
untenable position of having created a remedy 
for plaintiffs and then barring them from 
exercising it before they had any practical 
opportunity to do so. 
Id. at 87. 
In the present case, the Plaintiff was not in a 
position to notify the state until she had successfully verified, 
despite the state's denials, that Flinders was in fact a state 
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employee (R.22-26). A holding that her action is automatically 
barred, followed to its logical conclusion, would suggest that 
any Plaintiff, before commencing an action against any natural 
person whose employment is not unequivocally known, should 
provide written notice to the state in case such person is a 
secret state employee. 
In Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 
P.2d 159 (1969), the Plaintiff brought suit for injuries 
sustained in the collapse of a high school bleacher. Although 
her action was brought after the expiration of the applicable 
limitations period (measured from the date of her injury), she 
claimed an estoppel based on representations by the Defendant's 
insurance adjuster that she would be compensated as soon as her 
damages were ascertained, and based on her evidence that she did 
not learn of denial of the claim until after the limitations 
period had expired. The Court held that she should be allowed to 
present evidence of her claim of estoppel, saying: 
The record that was before the trial court 
upon the motion for summary judgment 
discloses the existence of a genuine issue of 
a material fact, namely, whether defendant is 
estopped to assert [the statute of 
limitations]. 
^d. at 163. 
In the present action, the trial court found that 
"there was unrefuted testimony by affidavit that the State of 
Utah denied through the Division of Personnel Management that 
Defendant Flinders was an employee of the State of Utah" (R. 
208). For purposes of Defendant's motion for summary judgement, 
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the trial court should have followed such finding to its 
necessary conclusion and ruled in the Plaintiff's favor. 
Under Myers v. McDonald, supra, the Plaintiff should 
have been permitted to present evidence, at the trial court 
level, with respect to: 
(1) her due diligence in attempting to determine 
whether the Defendant Flinders was in fact an employee of the 
state; and 
(2) the state's misrepresentation or concealment as to 
the fact of Flinders' employment with the state. 
If the Plaintiff can prove either of the foregoing at the trial 
court level, she should be entitled to pursue her action as 
though notice had been given pursuant to statute. 
POINT II 
THE LAW OF CALIFORNIA, DENYING INTERSPOUSAL 
IMMUNITY FOR NEGLIGENT TORTS, IS CONTROLLING 
IN ACTIONS BETWEEN CALIFORNIA DOMICILIARIES 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant George Forsman were, at 
the time of the subject accident and at the time this action was 
commenced, a married couple domiciled in California (R. 183). 
California does not recognize interspousal immunity for 
negligent torts. In Klein v. Klein, 26 Cal.Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 
70 (1962), a wife sued her husband for injuries resulting from 
her slipping on a boat deck, which she alleged was wet because of 
her husband's negligence. The California Supreme Court overruled 
its previous cases and rejected the spousal immunity doctrine. 
The Plaintiff is aware of no decisions by the Utah 
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Supreme Court deciding whether the law of the family domicile or 
the law of the state where the tort occurred should be used to 
determine the presence or absence of intra-family tort immunity. 
However, the Plaintiff urges the adoption of the view set forth 
in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which includes 
the following: 
Section 145, The General Principle 
(1) The rights and liabilities of the 
parties with respect to an issue in tort are 
determined by the local law of the state 
which, with respect to that issue, has the 
most significant relationship to the 
occurrence and the parties under the 
principles stated in Section 6 [stating 
choice-of-law principles] . 
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in 
applying the principles of Section 6 to 
determine the law applicable to an issue 
include: 
(a) the place where the injury occurred, 
(b) the place where the conduct causing 
the injury occurred, 
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, 
place of incorporation and place of business 
of the parties, and 
(d) the place where the relationship, if 
any, between the parties is centered. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according 
to their relative importance with respect t3 
the particular issue. 
* * * 
Section 169. Intra-Family Immunity 
(1) The law selected by application of the 
rule of Section 145 determines whether one 
member of a family is immune from tort 
liability to another member of the family. 
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(2) The applicable law will usually be the 
local law of the state of the parties' 
domicil. 
Comment: 
* * * 
b. Rationale, An immunity from tort 
liability is commonly possessed in varying 
circumstances by one spouse against the other 
spouse ..• [T]he state of the parties1 
domicil will almost always be the state of 
dominant interest, and, if so, its local law 
should be applied to determine whether there 
is immunity in the particular case, 
(Emphasis added.) 
Although much older cases in other jurisdictions have 
held that the law of the situs of the accident controls as to the 
question of interspousal immunity, many newer cases have adopted 
the view set forth in the Restatement (Second). The leading case 
is Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955), in which the 
California Supreme Court held that California law governing 
intra-family immunities would govern as between California 
domiciliaries involved in an automobile accident in Idaho. The 
Court said: 
We think that disabilities to sue and 
immunities from suit because of a family 
relationship are more properly determined by 
reference to the law of the state of the 
family domicile. That state has the primary 
responsibility for establishing and 
regulating the incidents of the family 
relationship and it is the only state in 
which the parties can, by participation in 
the legislative processes, effect a change in 
those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable 
that the rights, duties, disabilities, and 
immunities conferred or imposed by the family 
relationship should constantly change as 
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members of the family cross state boundaries 
during temporary absences from their home. 
Id., at 223. 
The facts in Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 
P.2d 254 (1968), are identical to those at bar. A husband and 
wife, both domiciliaries of New York, were involved in an 
automobile accident in Arizona. The wife brought suit against 
the husband in an Arizona court for her injuries. Interspousal 
tort suits were not permitted under the law of Arizona, but were 
permitted under the law of New York. The Arizona Supreme Court 
held that the law of New York, permitting suit between spouses, 
should be applied. The Court quoted with approval from Clark v. 
Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), as follows: 
[The] old rule is today almost completely 
discredited as an unvarying guide to choice 
of law decision in all tort cases ... No 
conflict of laws authority in America today 
agrees that the old rule should be retained 
... No American court which has felt free to 
re-examine the matter thoroughly in the last 
decade has chosen to retain the old rule ... 
It is true that some courts, even in recent 
decisions, have retained it ... But their 
failure to reject it has resulted from an 
unwillingness to abandon established 
precendent ... not to any belief that the old 
rule was a good one. 222 A.2d at 207. 
Id. at 255. 
The Utah Supreme Court in this case is not bound by any 
established Utah precedent, and is therefore free to reach a 
decision based on the policy factors involved. Utah's interest 
in the application of law to this case is in the area of 
automobile negligence and the rules of traffic as they relate to 
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safety on Utah highways. Utah has no interest in regulating the 
marital relationships of California residents. 
The Arizona Court in Schwartz went on to specifically 
adopt the Restatement (Second) analysis, noted that two contacts 
attached to Arizona (place of injury, place of conduct) and two 
attached to New York (domicile of the parties, place where 
relationship of the parties is centered) and said: 
While New York and Arizona possess the same 
number of contacts, the determination of 
which state has the most significant contacts 
is primarily qualitative, not quantitative. 
To aid in this evaluation the writers of the 
Restatement have provided that in regard to 
intra-family tort immunity the contact of the 
parties1 domicile shall receive the most 
weight. 
.Id. at 257-258. 
Other jurisdictions have also held, consistently with 
the Restatement (Second), that the law of the marital domicile, 
and not the law of the accident situs, controls as to 
interspousal immunity from tort action. These include Armstrong 
v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska, 1968) in which the husband 
and wife were residents of Alaska, the automobile accident 
occurred in the Yukon Territory, and Alaska law permitting suit 
between spouses was applied; Haumschild v. Continental Casualty 
Co., 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959), in which the husband and 
wife were domiciled in Wisconsin, the automobile accident 
occurred in California, and the Court expressly overruled six 
prior cases in order to apply the Wisconsin rule; and Koplik v. 
C.P. Trucking Corporation, 141 A.2d 34, 27 N.J. 1 (1958) in which 
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the husband and wife were domiciled in New Jersey, the automobile 
accident occurred in New York, and the New Jersey rule was 
applied. 
Utah has not been locked into the outmoded rule that 
the law of the accident situs controls as to mtra-family 
immunity issues. Utah has no interest in determining the 
incidents of marriages between persons who are not Utah 
residents. The state with such an interest is California, the 
state of residence. This Court is therefore asked to adopt the 
rule of the Restatement (Second), that the law of the domicile 
controls as to spousal immunity, and apply California law so as 
to permit the Plaintiff's action. 
POINT III 
UTAH'S RULE GRANTING INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY FOR 
NEGLIGENT TORTS SHOULD BE OVERRULED 
Utah's rule preventing one spouse from suing another 
for negligence has been based on Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 
2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963). Although this Court has not 
subsequently had occasion to address the precise issue, the logic 
which has subsequently been applied by this Court to similar 
situations applies with equal force to rejection of the spousal 
immunity doctrine. 
In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), this Court 
unanimously held the Utah Guest Statute unconstitutional, after 
having previously upheld its constitutionality. This Court 
summarized the history of guest statutes, pointing out that of 
the thirty states which had enacted guest statutes in the 1920s 
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and 1930s, there were only five remaining with guest statutes 
which had not been substantially limited. The Court observed 
that "[g]uest statutes have been widely and strongly criticized 
by legal commentators over the years." _Id. at 663. 
This Court also pointed out the effect of subsequent 
legislation in reversing the policy behind the Guest Statute, 
stating: 
[The No-Fault Insurance Act (U.C.A. Sees. 31-
41-1 et seg., since superseded by Sees. 31A-
22-301 through 310)] provided a limited 
remedy for all persons injured in an 
automobile accident and thereby significantly 
modified the rights and remedies of victims 
of automobile accidents, including automobile 
guests. 
• * * 
[The No-Fault Act] require[s] every owner of 
an automobile either to purchase public 
liability insurance or to provide equivalent 
security ... 
Id. at 665-666. 
The foregoing arguments apply with equal force to the 
doctrine of mterspousal immunity, at least as applied to 
automobile accidents. 
The mterspousal immunity doctrine, like the Guest 
Statute, is an obsolete rule. In Klein v. Klein, 26 Cal.Rptr. 
102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962), the California Supreme Court overruled 
its previous decisions so as to eliminate the doctrine of 
mterspousal immunity for negligent torts, saying: 
In Self v. Self, supra, Cal.App., 20 Cal. 
Rptr. 781 [involving an intentional tort], it 
was held that because the reasons for the 
rule of mterspousal immunity for torts no 
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longer exists, and because of certain 
legislative changes in recent years, that 
rule should be abandoned. 
* * * 
It is, of course, fundamental in the law of 
torts that any person proximately injured by 
the act of another, whether that act be 
willful or negligent, should, in the absence 
of statute or compelling reasons of public 
policy, be compensated. 
Id. at 71-72. 
Just as with respect to the Guest Statute, the Utah No-
Fault Insurance laws have reversed the underlying policy behind 
the spousal immunity doctrine. Such laws require owners of 
automobiles to carry public liability insurance. Thus spousal 
immunity serves to protect not the negligent spouse, but the 
negligent spousefs insurance company. 
The original justification for the spousal immunity 
doctrine was based on the view that suits between spouses would 
lead to marital discord. Such a justification has been rendered 
obsolete by the almost universal existence of automobile 
insurance. Indeed, as Prosser has pointed out, the opposite 
conclusion is more likely: 
The chief reason relied upon by [courts which 
accept the spousal immunity doctrine] is that 
personal tort actions between the husband and 
wife would disrupt and destroy the peace and 
harmony of the home, which is against the 
policy of the law. This is on the bald 
theory that after a husband has beaten his 
wife, there is a state of peace and harmony 
left to be disturbed; and that if she is 
sufficiently injured or angry to sue him for 
it, she will be soothed and deterred from 
reprisals by denying her the legal remedy ... 
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Any such precarious structure, subjected to 
this type of long-continued critical 
hammering, is likely sooner or later to 
develop cracks. 
Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed., at 863. 
The decision in Rubalcava, supra, was largely based on 
the theory that to allow suits between husband and wife would 
permit collusion against insurance companies. The possibility of 
collusion by spouses against insurance companies was addressed by 
the California Supreme Court in Klein v. Klein, supra, when it 
overruled its prior cases and rejected the spousal immunity 
doctrine. The Court said: 
The contention that there may be insurance 
involved, and that to permit such actions in 
such cases will encourage collusion, fraud 
and perjury, is also not convincing. Such 
arguments should be advanced to the 
Legislature, and not to the courts. 
• * * 
The possibility of fraud or perjury exists to 
some degree in all cases. But we do not deny 
a cause of action to a party because of such 
a danger. 
• • * 
It would be a sad commentary on the law if we 
were to admit that the judicial processes are 
so ineffective that we must deny relief to a 
person otherwise entitled simply because in a 
future case a litigant may be guilty of fraud 
or collusion. Once that concept were 
accepted, then all causes of action should be 
abolished. Our legal system is not that 
ineffectual. 
^d. at 72-73. 
This Court has also rejected the fraud or collusion 
argument in its more recent cases. In Malan, supra, with respect 
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to the Guest Statute, this Court said: 
[T]he usual tools relied on in judicial 
proceedings to disclose fraud - discovery, 
the oath and cross-examination - are as 
effective in the host-guest situation as in a 
number of other situations that could give 
rise to fraud. To cut off the protection of 
negligence law for a whole class of 
automobile accident victims because a few 
persons within the class may attempt to 
commit a fraud ... is to discriminate 
invidiously. 
Id. at 674. 
This Court recently rejected the collusion rationale 
again in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1985), where it held a household exclusion clause in an 
automobile liability insurance policy invalid. In the portion of 
the opinion which was adopted unanimously, this Court said: 
[W]e are not persuaded that the collusion 
rationale ... ramains an adequate 
justification for the household exclusion 
clause ... [T]he risk of collusion in 
intrafamily litigation has never been 
accepted by this Court as grounds for 
endorsing the parent-child immunity doctrine, 
which has likewise never been established by 
the legislature. 
While we acknowledge the possibility of 
intrafamily collusion, we agree with the 
Kansas Supreme Court, which said: 
[T]he possibility of collusion exists to 
a certain extent in any case ... Exper-
ience has shown that the courts are* 
quite adequate for this task ... 
Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768-
69, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980). 
• * * 
In addition, other safeguards exist to 
protect insurers against unscrupulous 
collusive households. Insurers conduct 
thorough investigations, require prompt 
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notice of accidents, and function as 
specialists in their fields. They are not 
likely to be easy victims of fraudulent 
lawsuits. The insured is always represented 
by the insurance company, who will carefully 
represent the insurer's interest as well as 
the interest of the insured. Furthermore, 
most policies require cooperation from the 
insured and provide penalties for false 
statements. By law, it is a criminal offense 
to present any false or fraudulent claim upon 
any contract of insurance. U.C.A., 1953, 
Section 76-6-521. 
I^d. at 235-236. 
There is no valid reason to presume that married 
couples are more likely to attempt fraud, or more able to commit 
fraud successfully, than guests in collusion with their hosts or 
children in collusion with their parents. Having explicitly 
rejected the fraud and collusion rationale with respect to the 
two latter situations, this Court would be acting consistently if 
it rejected it with respect to married couples as well. 
The holding in Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra, which 
established spousal immunity for negligent torts in Utah, was 
based on construction of an ambiguous statute, Sections 30-2-1 
through 30-2-10, U.C.A. (1953), relating to a wifefs property 
rights. The statutory interpretation given in Rubalcava is 
subject to the same objections to constitutionality as were made 
with respect to the Guest Statute in Malan, supra, where this 
Court said: 
Article I, Section 24 [of the Utah 
Constitution, providing that "[a]11 laws of a 
general nature shall have uniform operation"] 
protects against two types of discrimination. 
First, a law must apply equally to all 
persons within a class. [Citations omitted.] 
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Second, the statutory classifications and the 
different treatment given the classes must be 
based on differences that have a reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the 
statute. [Citations omitted,] 
Id. at 670. 
According to this Court in Rubalcava, supra, the 
purpose of Sections 30-2-1 through 30-2-10, U.C.A. (1953), was 
"to depart from the [common law] marital unity fiction and to 
establish the wife as a separate personality legally." I^d. at 
392. With respect to the constitutional requirement of equal 
application to all persons within a class, equal application 
exists only if the class is defined as "wives who are the victims 
of their husbands1 negligence." Such a definition of the class 
is inconsistent with the requirement that the classification be 
based on differences which have a reasonable tendency to further 
the objectives of the statute. If the goal of the statute is to 
depart from the marital unity fiction and to establish the wife 
as a separate personality legally, then the statutory 
classification, as interepreted in Rubalcava, fails. 
Under Section 30-2-2, U.C.A. (1953), "[c]ontracts may 
be made by a wife, and liabilities incurred and enforced by or 
against her, to the same extent and in the same manner as if she 
were unmarried." As interpreted in Rubalcava, therefore, the 
stutute discriminates between wives who sue their husbands for 
negligent torts and those who sue their husbands under other 
causes of action. Such a discrimination has no reasonable 
relationship to the statutory objective of departure from the 
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marital unity fiction and establishment of the wife as a separate 
personality legally. Indeed, such a discrimination undercuts the 
statutory objectives as stated in Rubalcava. 
This Court, in Malan, was willing to hold the Guest 
Statute unconstitutional, after having previously upheld -its 
constitutionality. The arguments against the constitutionality 
of spousal immunity, as based on the statutory interpretation in 
Rubalcava, are equally compelling. However, a holding that the 
Utah wife's property rights statute is unconstitutional is not in 
fact necessary in this case. 
Utah, like most jurisdictions, has held that if a 
statute is subject to both a constitutionally permissible and a 
constitutionally impermissible interpretation, the 
constitutionally permissible interpretation will be adopted. 
Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 (1967); Howe 
v. Tax Commission, 10 Utah 2d 362, 353 P.2d 468 (1960); State 
Water Pollution Control Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 247, 
311 P.2d 370 (1957) . 
Prior to the decision in Rubalcava, a constitutionally 
permissible interpretation of Sections 30-2-1 through 30-2-10 had 
been made by the Utah Supreme Court in Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 
2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954), an action by a former wife against 
her former husband for a physical assault occuring prior to their 
divorce. In Taylor, the wife was permitted to maintain her 
action. The Court said the following with respect to the 
applicable statutes: 
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Under section 30-2-2, U.C.A. 1953, "Contracts 
may be made by a wife, and liabilities 
incurred by and enforced by or against her, 
to the same extent and in the same manner as 
if she were unmarried." (Emphasis [the 
Court's].) 
Under Section 30-2-4, U.C.A. 1953, "A wife 
may receive the wages for her personal labor, 
maintain an action therefor in her own name 
and hold the same in her own right, and may 
prosecute and defend all actions for the 
preservation and protection of her rights and 
property as if unmarried. There shall be no 
right of recovery by the husband on account 
of personal injury or wrong to his wife, ... 
but the wife may recover against a third 
person for such injury or wrong as if 
unmarried ..." (Emphasis [the Court's].) 
These sections are not limited to procedure 
but deal with substantive rights as well. 
* * * 
[I]t is clear that the legislature intended 
to establish the separate identity of the 
husband and wife in all property and personal 
rights the same as if they were not married. 
Giving these statutes a liberal construction 
to effect their objects and in the interest 
of justice requires us to hold that a wife 
can sue and be sued the same as if whe were 
unmarried, even for the recovery of damages 
from her husband for intentional personal 
injury. 
Id. at 697-698. 
In Rubalcava, the Court took a different view of the 
statute and overruled Taylor "[i]nsofar as that case may be 
considered inconsistent." _Id. at 394. Since Taylor dealt with 
an intentional tort and Rubalcava with a negligent tort, the 
result of Rubalcava was apparently to have spousal immunity apply 
in Utah with respect to negligent but not intentional torts. 
The California Supreme Court found the distinction 
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between intentional and negligent torts unpersuasive when it 
abandoned the spousal immunity doctrine for negligent torts in 
Klein v. Klein, supra, saying: 
It is our opinion that the logical and legal 
reasons ... that cause us to abandon the old 
rule as to intentional torts apply with equal 
force to negligent torts. 
It is of some significance that, so far as we 
have been able to ascertain, none of the 18 
states that have adopted the more modern view 
have drawn such a distinction. [This 
statment was made prior to the Utah holding 
in Rubalcava.] 
.Id. at 72. 
Thus, it is not necessary in this case for this Court 
to hold a statute unconstitutional, as it did in Malan, supra. 
The appellant merely seeks to have the Court readopt the 
constitutionally permissible statutory construction already 
adopted in Taylor, supra, and extend it to negligent torts. The 
statute relating to a wife's property rights, U.C.A. Sections 30-
2-1 through 30-2-10, draws no distinction between intentional and 
negligent acts. The Rubalcava case is simply inconsistent with 
the logic and philosophy followed by this Court in its more 
recent decisions, and should not be followed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff respectfully seeks an Order of the Court 
reversing the summary judgments of the District Court in favor of 
the Defendants Ronald G. Flinders and George Forsman. The 
Plaintiff seeks to be permitted to present to the trial court her 
evidence of her due diligence and the State of Utah's 
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misrepresentation with respect to her claim against Ronald G. 
Flinders, and her evidence of negligence with respect to her 
claims against Ronald G. Flinders and George Forsman. 
Respectfully submitted this LttL.day of November, 1986. 
J. KENT HOLLAND 
GORDON J. ySWENSON 
ANDERSON / HOLLAND 
623 EastyFirst South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 




RONALD G. FLINDERS, GEORGE L. 




M. CHRIS HARRISON 
CIVIL NO. C-84-6702 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) ss« 
I, M. CHRIS HARRISON, after being first duly 
sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That his name is M« Chris Harrison and that 
he is a private investigator, licensed by Salt Lake County, 
doing business as Bureau of Investigation. 
2. That on January 11, 1984, attorney J, Kent 
Holland requested his services to investigate an accident 
and the parties involved in said accident that occured at 
the intersection of 5th South and 3rd West betwwen a vehicle 
driven by George Forsman, in which Mr* Holland's client 
was a passenger, and a vehicle driven by an individual whose 
name was given as Ronald G. Flinders* 
3* That pursuant to that request he contacted 
the investigating officer, Artie Banks and interviewed him 
on March 23, 1984* 
4* That he conducted a license plate search at 
Utah Department of Motor Vehicles* The vehicle license 
MPV 372 as given by the State of Utah Investigating 
Officer's Report of Traffic Accident on March 23, 1984 and 
was told that there was no record of issuance of any plate 
in the state with the designation MPV 372-
5« That he did a drivers license check on the 
name of Ronald G» Flinders and was given an address of P*0. 
Box 354, Clearfield, Utah 84015* 
6• That he sent a letter to that address to 
confirm the identity of that individual, but said letter 
was returned as undeliverable as addressed* 
7 • That he called the Division of Personnel 
Management State of Utah requesting confirmation of 
employment by the State of Utah of an individual named 
Ronald G. Flinders and was advised that an individual with 
that name was not employed by the State of Utah according 
to their records* 
8. That as a result of his investigation, he 
advised J. Kent Holland, the attorney who had hired him 
that., in his professional opinion the vehicle was no" a 
State owned vehicle and that the driver who had given the 
name Ronald G. Flinders was not an employee of the State 
of Utah or any subdivision thereof. 
DATED this ?1^ day of '///cl-i,/ 1985-
M. CHRIS HARRISON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day 
of March, 1985. 
NOTARY PUBLIC --/' 
RESIDING AT: S'ALT LAKE COUNTY 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
fMf&r**"*^, **E5?ri -'.;:» 
AHDKRSOH •& HOLLAND 
J. KENT HOLLAND, #1520 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
623 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 




RONALD G- FLINDERS, GEORGE L. 





CIVIL NO. C-84-6702 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
ss. 
I, PATRICIA CHAPMAN, after being first duly sworn, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. That her name is Patricia Chapman. 
2. That through her employment she*comes in 
contact with the Salt Lake City Police Department. 
3« That J* Kent Holland, who is a personal friend 
of hers, contacted her initially in April, 1984 to see if 
through her contacts she could obtain information on Utah 
vehicle license number MPV 372 because he had been advised 
by the State of Utah through the department of motor 
vehicles that there was no such plate with those letters 
and numbers. 
4. That she did request her contacts to check 
on the aforementioned plate number and was advised that 
they had checked for said plate by computer and it was not 
listed as a current valid plate. 
5« That she advised J. Kent Holland of her 
investigation and the non-existence of a listing of that 
aforementioned license plate. 
DATED this <$ / day of (/'foAr A _ > 1985. 
UC(^ (_ /<ZZ/3f7ia/!(. 
PATRICIA CHAPMAN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s . - . Y T 
day of //Al-ic^ 1985. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
&/(skf 
lc/g .^A+til^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC , / 
RESIDING AT: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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E X H I B I T " A " 
uotf 
June 20, 1984 
Ronald G. Flinders 
4501 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah R4119 
Re: Our Client: Audrey Forsman 
Accident Date: June 22,1983 
Location: 5th South 3rd West 
Salt Lake City,Ut. 
Dear Mr. Flinders: 
As you may or may not be aware, Audrey Forsman has 
consulted our law firm with regard to the above accident. We 
have been in the process of investigating the matter and arc 
quite concerned that the information provided the investigating 
officer is false. The State of Utah denies your employment and 
the State Department of Motor Vehicles denies any license plate 
wijth the MPV 372 exists. 
Please notify this office as soon as possible if you 
are an employee of the State of Utah and the proper license tor 
the vehicle you were driving. 
If you are a state employee this letter is notice that 
a claim exists and a complaint will be filed based on your 
negligence in operation of your vehicle causing the collision 
with the vehicle in which my client was a passenger. 
If you are covered by liability insurance, please pro-
vide us with the name of your insurance company so that we can 
deal directly with them and minimize further inconvenience to 
you. 
If you do not have insurance, please notify us 
immediately. 
Your cooperation and prompt attention to this matter 
w 
E X H I B I T " B " 
cry 11 lolh'if 
i %\ 
Jt-rson & Holland 
••:r:» A Ctiunwlors 
F.au Fir si South 





Ronald G. Flinders 
P.O. Box 354 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
FLI 51 99071'tNl •r::./j:Vfl/i 
RETURN TO BENDER 
NOT DELIVERABLE AS ADDRESSED 
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P l a i n t i f f , 
f\ r\ r\ \( \ 
h.y a ; 
—vs — 
GEORGE FORSMAN, RONALD: 
G, FLINDERS and 
DOES I t h r o u g h X, 
Defendants. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY, NARCOTIC &LIQUOR 
LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION. 
Plaintiff, : 
—vs — 
GEORGE LEIAND FORSMAN, 
Defendant/Cross-
C l a i m a n t . 
CIVIL Nu, CKS-020 2 
Hr Tm REMEMBERED, t h a t on t h e 1 7 t h day of J u n e , 1986, t h e 
above-^-v. : t l e J c a u s e ; ... Mine "Mi, r e a u l a r l y for h e a r i n g ! 
.* * b e f o r e t h e HONORABLE DEAN £. CCNDER' 
ofjT : r . ; - •' lamed C o u r t . | 
-: .e 
the Defendant: 
Mr. J. Kent Holland 
Attorney At Law 
623 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Mr. John R. Lund 
Attorney At Law 
10 Exchange Place 




















WHEREUPON the following proceedings were had: 
11 
THE COURT: Forsman versus Forsman. Question here 
i 
2 | ! 
is interspousal tort immunity. The case cf Farmer's 
3 I 
Insurance versus Call did not abolish the interspousal 
4 . 
tort in the State, of Ut*u I sat on that one on the 
5 I 
Supreme Court, and the big issue there was the insurance 
company making a limitation in their policy and failing toj 
deliver a policy to the insured;and the Court concluded, 
can't stand on a limitation and not deliver the notice to 
the insured. Don't think there was any intent nor in that 
case for interspousal tort. I don't see how it can overrule 
it,, 
MR. LUND: John Lund for the defendant, the moving 
party. The same is true in the Malan versus Lewis case, 
the other case the plaintiff contends will change that law, 
Malan versus Lewis overruled the Guest statute, perhaps 
expressed a little dissatisfaction with the concept of 
hospitality for the reason for a resulting law suit 
against a completely different issue. Interspousal tort 
immunity goes far beyond automobile casesand far beyond 
cases where there is insurance and justification I think,! 
is a good deal stronger for interspousal tort*immunity 
than it would be for the Guest statute. There is a lot of 
other problems for the Giaest statute,-other than there ars 
problems in the hospitality. We contend that the choice 
of Uthh law would govern, because this accident happened 
in Utah. If the accident happened in California, then 
California law would govern, but it's not -t-h^-t- ri^ar as w^ll. 
THE, COURT: Mr. Holland. How do you get: around 
the interspousal tort immunity? 
MR. HOLLAND: I feel first, really that T don't 
think *+• is 3. t : ') . immunity is a3:ve - r. Utahj 
anymore -hink tne reasons aie set ^nt ver v. .•:..: 1 .1 
1 -• .an a. ~ Mile . \ers*>3 Lev: idm: r.tedlir 
t^a* nvolved ^ Farmer ^ : mother and 
chiAu and Malan versus L e w i s ™ 
. 1 involved ^^ chile. Tv:e mother 
hac t - Z& *•: :- Guardian ; ' T,,fem : ;: . ... 
MH, HOLLAND: I understand that, Your Honor, but 
I think, it's the laagudt * • y^ t_ 1*, strong and 
the fact is, the purpose ,»- ",••-.-»- u 7oes t er--
1 v i r. id:-i. i ."3 1.1T it " ' •" ' • „ -w i n s e r t ' ^•? 
The idea .. insurance i^ ctimsl 
tomobile-caused mishaps;and in quoting from Farmer's 
versus Call, there ,1 s- »,« iioiJ!r»ehold exclusion permitted... 
* - statute therefore, directs that no automobile :m ar^nce 
nu3 / e-elude household members, That's what we have 
\ ej •- ''Exclusion becomes part 11. uhu iy — then quolniq further 
- exclusion becomes particiilar.lv disturbing when viewed 
z 01 the fact that tn;> class of victims"—family 
2*i ( members, wives -. -ers and sisters—" i.s the one 
?4 J most frequently exposed ,.* potential neyliqen ^ >• the | 
named " 
THE COURT: n^ w* the State of 
Utah that specifically says you can't have interspousal ton. 
2 
I 
MR. HOLLAND: Not to my knowledge, Your Eoncr, and 
I think it's important too, in looking at this in the 
Malan versus Lewis case, which is the landmark case in 
Utah, overruling our Supreme Court and quoted very heavily 
from the Stevens versus Stevens case ,-which was a ! 
family tort case in Michigan;and they stated , " The friends 
of the driver, his family...must suffer injury at his hands 
without recompense, solaced only by the thought that, aftpr 
all, the skull was cracked by a friendly hand....Why? 
Because the relationship between them was one of trust an# 
friendship. No money had changed hands0 If, however, 
not the neighbor himself is carried to town, but rather 
his livestock to the slaughterhouse, many modern courts 
will permit full recovery for injury to the unfortunate 
animal through failure to use reasonable care for its 
safety. Is this one answer of an enlightened people to 
the hallowed question: M How much then ,4^ t* #an 
better than a sheep? M 
I think the fact that our Utah Supreme Court took! 
a family tort question and used it specifically in quoting 
for their overturning of the Guest statute, tjiere were 
many guest statute-cases overturned all across the nationl 
Been over twenty-five states I think that have overturned), 
but by case law that there had been twenty-one where it 
had been found unconstitutional, yet the Utah Supreme 
Court quoted one specifically and that was Stevens versusl 











Far/..-- - versus CR.II. 
*'„ " - .
 v
.-iK
 ;-_: ha* e an interesting; 
point r.^ t *-,; - there' - e- toward what 
: ••i.r^  c:r Supreme Court h-is not gone that far 
yet, 
MR. HOLLAND: Alright, ' -v< l-.i o o U qoverjned 
the State i California. 
THE COURT: 1 i O a t . Why do we 
be governed ir the :ta'c u; California? 
weij,t 1 you, Your Honor, 
because we start off "i*^ + "<- . i." a 1 : f or n la has an 
.s, doe- not recognise . nterspousal immunity], 
Tha* .* :: ^  - c^se 'lein. Then we go ta 
Restatement, second section i< ?;anc tnat is the Restatement 
sayincr- 'are;-' " The law selected 
by application c * .-<. • .iiapl ' ir i *he lawi 
~^# che most significant relationship- 'deter;-
r. ;...-> whether one : ; ..-. .5 immune from tort 
lability to another member ..*e z.mily. u ," In* applicable 
jje wiie local law of the state of the parties 
iomicil.. 
Rationale. An immunity from tort liability „a ":om.nar,]y 
possessea instances by one spouse against 
the other r ~ state »-: the parties* u\m\\«:\\ wiM almost 



























THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. I think that 
we've had the law in this state of interspousal immunity. 
That has been the law, hasn't it? 
MR. HOLLAND: Rubalcava is the case, Your Honor. 
Very inportant to note that Rubalcava was before no-fault 
THE COURT: Ok. Now, the Supreme Court in those 
two cases did touch on this question of whether or not, 
under current law this immunity is going to destroy the 
family relationship. In both cases they talked about,we 
don't think that has that much influence on the family 
relationship, but they did not, in both of those cases, 
say, that we are now holding that interspousal immunity 
is no longer the law of the State of Utah. 
MR. HOLLAND: Allright. 
THE COURT: That's correct, isn't it? 
MR. HOLLAND: You know, I think that they have in 
so many words or less, said yes, there is no longer interj-
spousal immunity. That was not the question before the 
court, because it wasn't a husband and wife it was a 
mother and child. 
THE COURT: I sat on it and listened,to the 
argument 71 was with them. 
MR. HOLLAND: I understand that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that was not discussed. That was 
not an issue that was raised before the court. 
MR. HOLLAND: Allright. 
6 
THE COURT: So that: I iK-.V't U H I I K I-hit t h e Suprem£ 
GCMF t 11 i, nv«7 - M Led I n t e r s p o u s a 1 immuni t y . 
Mr<. HOLIAND: i b ' i ' j b t "» t h a t ' s t r u e , t h e n I am 
not s a y i n g tha*: :* " , b u t if I t ' s t r u e , Mrs . Eur s.iian, who| 
was • • . g r i e v o u s l y and s p e n t two weeks up 
h e r e a t LDS H o s p i t a l s h o u l d not i>. ; t e l u d e d f^  Dm he r day! 
r,, She has lo* L a t t h i s p o i n t , he r c a y s e c f a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t Ronala ^ „ i< L i ider •• rh»j di i v e r of t h e o t h e r c a r 
and I think that under 
THK COURT: Wait a minute. How has she lott her| 
cause of action against the diivei MI- H ^ other car "' 
This is between she and her1" husband in this particular 
case. 
MR. HOLIAND: And the driver 01 the it in- r, 1 . 
THE COURT : The driver of the other cai / i;/'ie 
has her right of action ti lei e, 
MR. HOLIAND: Your Honor granted Summary Judgment 
against that othei II.T.PMM. 
I donf t remember t;ha i:. 
The State of Utah employee that 
to auiuxu what he was 
THE COURT: 
MR HOLIAND: 







Tii sovereign immunity situation. 
So when tuey denieci it we filed a 



























here I donft think,what we're looking at is the fact 
that all the cases and there hasn't been a State of Utah 
case on the point of interspousal immunity. Defendant hasj 
quoted tremendously from Madison versus Deseret Livestock. 
That case was not a case at all of one spouse sueing another 
And it was a Federal Court case—the Arizona Court deciding 
what they thought the Utah law was. So, I mean that case 
is out in left field. All the other cases in all the 
jurisdictions surrounding us say, that when a case under 
interspousal immunity arises, it should be decided by the! 
domiciled state. A California case, Emery versus Emery, a] 
Supreme Court case with California law governing intra 
family immunities would govern as between California 
domiciliaries involved in an automobile accident in Idahoi 
Another case is Armstrong versus Armstrong. That's 
an Alaska case. Persons were injured and Alaska law 
governed as to interspousal immunity, even though they 
were injured in Canada. Schwartz versus Schwartz, an 
Arizona case. Accident occurred in Arizona and husband 
andJwife domiciled in New York. New York rules allowing 
suits between spouses applied. Hanmschild vorsus Continental 
Insurance. Husband and wife domiciled in Wisconsin and the 
automobile accident occurred in California. Wisconsin rufe 
applied. Koplik versus C P Trucking Company, New Jersey, 
Husband and wife domiciled in New Jersey and the automobile 
occurred in New York, and the New Jersey rule applied. 
—We couldn't find any cases where the domiciliary law of 
8 
t w i\ iM:a.n \ and wife did not applyrand in this 
case, both Audrey and George Forsman, husband a:;.,.-
reside TM California. California lav should be applied. 
California has the mosI LTteres: in deciding whether 
interspousil immunity should or should noi exis*. . Tnere 
interest is tiier*1 . a.'.i ,1 Audrey and George Forsman ai e 
residents of California, and that's wi,,y Restatement: and 
all. nf t hp succeeding cases-after thd"; say the domiciliary 
law is the law t% .. m mterspousal 
immunity. 
THE CiUJP? v I lie the natter under advisement. 
Take a look at it. 
ME, HOLLAND: Thank you very much. 
(WHEREUPON th.:: Ii^ arir:^  was concluded.) 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH \ ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Hal M. Walton, do hereby certify that I am a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of Utah;that on 
June 17, 1986 I appeared before the above-named Court and 
reported in Stenotype the preceeding 9 pages of transcript 
and that the same is a true transcription of my shorthand 
notes as repoted by me. 
I^ICJ 
' ft.M. Walton C.S.R. 
Datedj June 18, 1986 
ADDENDUM C 
^^ ^^ &sas^ '***«^ j^ 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
JOHN R. LUND 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant George L. Forsman 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JUN2GIS86 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




GEORGE FORSMAN, RONALD 
FLINDERS and DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY, NARCOTIC & LIQUOR 
LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGE LELAND FORSMAN, 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 
Civil No. C84-6702 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
FORSMAN'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C85-0202 
Honorable Dean E. Condei 
Defendant George Forsman's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment against- Audrey Forsman having come on regularly for hear-
ing before the Honorable Dean E. Conder on June 17, 198 6 at 
8:00 a.m. and plaintiff Audrey Forsman having been represented 
by her counsel, J. Kent Holland, and defendant George Forsman 
having been represented by his counsel, John R. Lund, and the 
court having reviewed the memoranda filed herein, having heard 
oral argument, and having been fully apprised, it is hereby 
ORDERED as follows: 
Defendant George Forsman's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Audrey Forsman is granted* Plaintiff's 
Complaint against George Forsman is dismissed with prejudice, 
each party to bear their own costs. 
DATED this 2-(>day of June, 198 6. 
BY THE COURT: 
Dean E^ . Conder, Judge 
Third Judicial District 
Salt Lake County 
Approved As To For 
^^^^^Ls • Jrf r^/ ;A/ *-&<*&':«**°^ 
^ o k n R. 
Attorjrey for Defendant 
George Forsman 
1 ^;iK 
J. Ifent Holland 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Audrey Forsman 
-2-
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN - 4411 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: 53 3-7650 
JUN 2 6 1986 
H. Dfxpt^ndley.jSl^k 3r/Oist. C6urt 
y
 \ sf ' Cep'Jty Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 





RONALD G. FLINDERS, and 
DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY, NARCOTIC & LIQUOR 




D e f e n d a n t -
C r o s s - C l a i m a n t . 
ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. C84-6702 
C i v i l No. C85-0202 
J u d g e Dean E. Conder 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r came on f o r h e a r i n g f o r t h e 
second t ime on D e f e n d a n t Rona ld G. F l i n d e r s 1 Mot ion f o r Summary 
Judgment on O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1 9 8 5 . P l a i n t i f f a p p e a r e d t h r o u g h he r 
a t t o r n e y , J . Kent H o l l a n d , and D e f e n d a n t F l i n d e r s a p p e a r e d 
t h r o u g h h i s a t t o r n e y , S a n d r a L . S j o g r e n , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y 
G e n e r a l , and D e f e n d a n t George L. Forsman a p p e a r e d t h r o u g h h i s 
a t t o r n e y , John R. Lund. 
OOU u^ 
The Court, having reviewed memoranda filed by both 
parties and after hearing arguments and being fully advised in 
the premises finds as follows: 
1. Although there was unrefuted testimony by affidavit 
that the State of Utah denied through the Division of Personnel 
Management that Defendant Flinders was an employee of the State 
of Utah, there was also unrefuted testimony through affidavit 
that Flinders was an employee of the State of Utah at the time of 
the accident, 
2. Defendant Flinders provided on the accident report 
the address of the Department of Public Safety where he is now 
and was then employed. 
3. Had Plaintiff contacted the Personnel Division of 
the Department of Public Safety, she would have received 
verification of Defendant Flinders' employment status with that 
agency. 
4. Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant at an address 
obtained from the Driver License Division which was returned as 
undeliverable. The postmark on the envelope is unreadable but 
the return date was August 7, 1984. 
5. Plaintiff sent a letter dated June 20, 1984 to 
Defendant at 4501 South 2700 West, which is the address of the 
Department of Public Safety and the Department of Transportation, 
without specifying to which Department the letter was directed. 
The letter was returned by the Department of Transportation 
without date. The postmark on this envelope is also unreadable. 
-9-
I. 
6. Defendant Flinders was acting within the scope of 
his employment on June 22, 1983 when the accident occurred. 
Having previously filed a minute entry on October 31, 
1985 granting Defendant Flinders1 motion, this Court now enters 
the following: 
ORDER 
Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-4(3, 4) (Supp. 1985), 
Defendant Flinders may only be sued in his capacity as a 
government employee for negligent operation of a motor vehicle 
during the performance of his duties within the scope of his 
employment. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7 (Supp. 1985) waives 
immunity of the State for such negligence. 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 
1985), however, bar claims against the State or its employee for 
an act or omission occurring during the performance of his 
duties, within the scope of his employment unless the Plaintiff 
first files a notice of claim with the attorney general and the 
agency concerned within one year after the claim arises. It is 
determined that, in spite of the Division of Personnel 
Management denial of employment and the letters sent to the 
addresses given by the Driver License Division and Defendant 
Flinders which requested employment information and gave 
Defendant notice that Plaintiff intended to file legal action, 
Plaintiff's attempts were insufficient as a matter of law to 
constitute the notice of claim required by § 63-30-12. 
Plaintiff's claim is, therefore, barred. 
_-*_ ^O^v^ 
It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Flinders' Motion 
for Summary Judgment in case number C85-6702 is granted. 
DATED this t^L day of "^^ l i l ^ 1986. 
O 
BY THE COURT: 
<.L/ 
DEAN (SECONDER 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e 
Approved a s t o form t h i s 
day of , 19 8 6 . 
AiTErr 
J. KENT HOLLAND 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ADDENDUM D 
63-30-11. Claim for injury-Notice-
Content s-Service-Legal disability. 
(1) A claim is deemed to arise when 
the statute of limitations that would 
apply if the claim were against a 
private person commences to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for 
injury against a governmental entity 
or against an employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the perform-
ance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority 
shall, before maintaining an action, file 
a written notice of claim with such entity. 
(3) The notice of claim shall set forth 
a brief statement of the facts, the nature 
of the claim asserted, and the damages 
incurred by the claimant so far as they 
are known, shall be signed by the person 
making the claim or such person's agent, 
attorney, parent or legal guardian, and 
shall be directed and delivered to the 
responsible governmental entity in the 
manner and within the time prescribed 
in section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as 
applicable. 
(4) If, at the time the claim arises, 
the claimant is under the age of majority, 
or mentally incompetent and without a 
legal guardian, or imprisoned, upon 
application by the claimant and after 
hearing and notice to the governmental 
entity the court, in its discretion, may 
extend the time for service of notice 
of claim; but in no event shall it grant 
an extension which exceeds the applicable 
statute of limitations. In determining 
whether to grant an extension, the court 
shall consider whether the delay in serving 
the notice of claim will substantially 
prejudice the governmental entity in 
maintaining its defense on the merits. 
63-3jj[-12. Claim against state or its 
employee-Time for fi1ing notice . 
A claim against \:*u-* sl^i * or Its 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim 
is filed with the attorney general and the 
agency concerned within one year after the 
olarn arisen, >r: before hh^ expiration of 
<VYV extension of time granted under sub-
section 63-30-11 (4) . 
ADDENDUM E 
30-2-1 Wife's rights in property-
Liability for husband's debts 
Real and personal estate of every 
female acquired before marriage, 
and all property to which she may 
afterwards become entitled by 
purchase, gift, grant, inheritance, 
bequest or devise, shall be and 
remain the estate and property of 
such female, and shall not be liable 
for the debts, obligations or engage-
ments of her husband, and may be conveyed, 
devised or bequeathed by her as if she 
were unmarried. 
30-2-2. Wife's right to contract, sue 
and be sued. 
Contracts may be made by a wife, and 
liabilities incurred and enforced by or 
against her, to the same extent and in the 
same manner as if she were unmarried. 
30-2-3. Conveyances between husband and 
wife . 
A conveyance, transfer or lien executed 
by either husband or wife to or in favor of 
the other shall be valid to the same extent 
as between other persons. 
30-2-4. Wife's right to wages-Actions for 
personal injury. 
A wife may receive the wages for her 
personal labor, maintain an action therefor 
in her own name and hold the same in her own 
right, and may prosecute and defend all 
actions for the preservation and protection 
of her rights and property as if unmarried. 
There shall be no right or recovery by the 
husband on account of personal injury or 
wrong to his wife, or for expenses connected 
therewith, but the wife may recover against 
a third person for such injury or wrong as if 
unmarried, and such recovery shall include * 
expenses of medical treatment and other 
expenses paid or assumed by the husband. 
30-2-5. Separate debts before and after 
marriage . 
Neither husband nor wife is liable for 
the debts or liabilities of the other 
incurred before marriage, and, except as 
herein otherwise declared, they are not 
liable for the debts of each other contracted 
after marriage; nor are the wages, earnings 
or property of either, or the rents or income 
of the property of either, liable for the sep 
debts of the other. 
30-2-6. Actions based on property rights 
Should the husband or wife obtain possession 
or control of property belonging to the other 
before or after marriage, the owner of the 
property may maintain an action therefor, or 
for any right growing out of the same, in 
the same manner and to the same extent as if 
they were unmarried. 
30-2-7. Husband's liability for wife's torts 
For civil injuries committed by a married 
woman damages may be recovered from her alone, 
and her husband shall not be liable therefor, 
except in cases where he would be jointly 
liable with her if the marriage did not exist. 
30-2-8. Agency between husband and wife. 
A husband or wife may constitute the other 
his or her attorney in fact to control and 
dispose of his or her property for their 
mutual benefit or otherwise, and may revoke 
the appointment the same as other persons. 
30-2-9. Family expenses-Joint and several 
liabi1ity. 
The expenses of the family and the eduction 
of the children are chargeable ua^i tMe property 
uf both husband and wife or of either of them, 
and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly 
or separately. 
33-2-10. Homestead rights-Custody of children 
Neither the husband nor wife can remove 
the other or their children from the homestead 
without the consent of the other, unless the 
owner of the property shall in good faith 
provide another homestead suitable to the 
condition in life of the family; and if a 
husband or wife abandons his or her spouse, 
that spouse is entitled to the custody of the 
minor children, unless a court of competent 
jurisdiction shall otherwise direct. 
